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SOME LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL




The history of judicial interpretation of the definition of a capital asset from
the Supreme Court's 1955 Corn Products decision to its 1988 Arkansas Best
decision points out the need to link any reestablishment of a capital gains tax with
a reformulation of the definitions of what is and what is not a capital asset. The
history shows that without such a link congressional intent may be thwarted.
Presumably, the objectives of any reestablishment of a preferential capital gains rate
will include (1) removing the impediments to economic growth caused by taxing
capital transactions at ordinary income rates and (2) increasing Government reve-
nue. These objectives may be frustrated by using the rules applicable to ordinary
income to tax capital transactions. The rules of ordinary income taxation may be
misapplied if the list of properties specifically excluded from the definition of a
capital asset is misinterpreted by the courts.'
The history of judicial interpretation of the present formulation of the
definition of an excluded asset shows that the definition can be given incompatible
interpretations. As a result, the definition was applied to a variety of assets not
specifically excluded from the definition of a capital asset The Corn Products
decision applied the definition to corn futures. At the time of the Corn Products
decision and for most of the period following it, the conventional construction of the
Corn Products decision was that the Supreme Court viewed the definition of an
excluded asset to be any property essential to everyday operations. This view of the
definition of an excluded asset served as precedent for expanding the list of excluded
properties beyond those specifically excluded by the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
from the definition of a capital asset. In the Arkansas Best decision, the Supreme
Court attempts to limit the application of the definition of an excluded asset to those
properties specifically excluded from the definition of a capital asset and to inven-
tory related futures contracts.
As the Supreme Court itself points out which interpretations of the definition
Assistant Professor of Accountancy, Wright State University; Ph.D. and M.B.A., State University of New
York at Buffalo; [Ohio].
Although the Code does not refer to them as such, for the sake of brevity the properties specifically excluded
from the definition of a capital asset are herein referred to as excluded assets.
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of an excluded asset would fulfill congressional policy objectives if a preferential
capital gains rate is reestablished may not be settled by its Arkansas Best decision.
Since futures contracts are not included in the definition of an excluded asset, the
question arises whether the Arkansas Best decision would meet congressional policy
objectives. Even if the decision would meet congressional policy objectives, lower
courts may nevertheless interpret the decision in a manner not intended by the
Supreme Court just as the Corn Products decision was interpreted by lower courts
in a manner not intended by the Supreme Court.
This article consists of six sections. The first section briefly indicates the
economic significance of the correct classification of property as either a capital or
an excluded asset. In the second section, the definition of a capital asset and the list
of properties specifically excluded from the definition are presented and analyzed.
The analysis demonstrates how the present formulations of the definition of an
excluded asset can be given a broad and a narrow interpretation. The third section
discusses how the Corn Products decision was conventionally construed to be based
on a broad interpretation of the definition of an excluded asset. The fourth section
shows how post-Corn Products judicial developments relied on the conventional
construction for expanding the list of excluded properties to properties not specifi-
cally excluded from the definition of a capital asset. Rather than going into detail
about each type of property to which the definition of an excluded asset was applied,
corporate securities are used as a surrogate for all of them. The fifth section presents
the Supreme Court's attempt to limit the application of the definition of an excluded
asset to those properties specifically excluded from the definition of a capital asset
and to inventory related futures contracts. Through an analysis of the Arkansas Best
decision, this section also demonstrates that expansion of the list of excluded
properties is not precluded by the Arkansas Best decision. The last section points out
some policy issues Congress needs to consider if it reformulates the Code's
definition of a capital asset and the properties specifically excluded from the
definition.
SOME ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A PREFERENTIAL
CAPITAL GAIN RATE
Applying ordinary income rates to capital gains hobbles economic growth by
(1) deterring the conversion of capital assets and (2) pushing up the rate of return
required on the proceeds from the sale of a capital asset. If the appreciated value
realized upon the sale of a capital asset is subject to ordinary income rates, it will be
taxed more heavily at the time of sale than if the appreciation had been taxed on an
annual basis.2 This higher tax liability deters the sale of a capital asset. For example,
suppose the owner of a downtown parcel of unimproved land currently rents it out
to an entrepreneur who uses it to operate a parking lot. Several years ago the
2 Note, Capital Gains: Can the Confusion Be Eliminated, 49 IOWA L. REV. 100 (1963).
(Vol. 6
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acquisition cost of the land was $10,000. Since then it has appreciated in value to
$12,000. The landowner's yield from rent is 5%. The landowner receives an offer
for the market value of the land from a developer who wants to erect a hotel on the
site. The developer's plans includethe creation of a parking lot in the basement of
the hotel and a shopping mall on the first floor. Implementation of the developer's
plans would benefit the local economy. Yet, the following deterrents to selling the
parcel of land may deprive the local economy of the incremental growth that would
result from the construction activity, hotel, and shopping mall: (1) If the sale is
postponed, so is the tax. (2) If the land is never sold, the tax never has to be paid
provided the owner holds the land until it is passed on by gift, charitable contribu-
tion, or death. (3) If the landowner is in a higher income bracket this year than he
expects to be next year, he can reduce his tax liability by delaying the realization of
gain. 3 These impediments are all attributable to taxing capital gains at ordinary
income rates. Taxing capital gains at preferential rates removes these obstacles to
economic growth.
Taxing capital gains at ordinary rates pushes up the rate of return required for
the reinvestment of the proceeds from the sale of a capital asset to a level higher than
would be the case if the gains were taxed at lower capital gains rates. For example,
suppose the landowner is contemplating reinvesting the proceeds from the sale of the
land in common stock of a new venture. The landowner must weigh the 5% rate of
return he currently receives in the form of rental revenue against the rate of return
of an investment in the new venture of an amount equal to the proceeds from the sale
of the land reduced by the tax payable on its appreciation.' As the tax rate increases
and threatens to absorb a larger proportion of the accrued gain on an investment, the
investor becomes less willing to cash in his appreciated investment property in order
to take advantage of the new investment opportunities. The rate of return required
in order for the new investment of the reduced amount to merely equal the yield of
the old investment increases and the investment opportunities offering such a return
decreases. For example, if the landowner is subject to a 90% tax rate, his proceeds
will be $12,000. Assuming no transaction costs, the rate of return the new venture
will have to yield the landowner in order for him to break even is 5.8% of 16% more
than his old investment. The consequences of taxing capital gains at ordinary income
rates are considerable for the economy and Government tax revenues.
Economic growth is slowed by taxing the appreciation in value of capital
assets at ordinary income rates. Economic growth is maximized if each individual
allocates his investment resources to maximize his yield. Obviously different
individuals view the same investment opportunity differently. As long as each
individual invests in those opportunities he thinks have the greatest relative value,
society's resources are allocated with maximum market efficiency. To the degree
3 Heller, Investors' Decision, Equity, and the Capital Gains Tax, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., Papers on Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability 384 (1955).
' Note, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary Income, 73 YALE L. J. 698 (1964).
3
Sprohge: Judicial Implications of Section 1221
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
to which the amount of taxes payable upon the sale of a capital asset deters its sale
and the reinvestment of the proceeds, maximum efficiency will not be obtained.
Deterring the sale of capital assets limits the pool of available capital for reinvest-
ment. Raising the rate or return required on the reinvestment of the proceeds from
the sale of a capital asset discourages risk taking. Generally, investments yielding
a high rate of return are riskier than those yielding a low rate of return. High rates
of return are usually associated with new growing ventures. Hence, by pushing up
the rate of return required on the reinvestment of the proceeds of the sale of capital
assets, economic growth is stultified.
It is perhaps too obvious to require explanation, but tax revenues from capital
gains can not be collected unless they are realized. The Government's tax revenues
on capital gains are limited to the degree to which taxing them at ordinary income
rates deters their realization. Furthermore, to the degrees to which taxing capital
gains at ordinary income rates stunt economic growth, they limit the creation of new
jobs and the taxes on the income of those jobs. By limiting the maximum tax rates
on capital gains, Congress may remove the deterrent effects that ordinary income
rates have on economic growth and Government tax revenues.
THE DEFINITION OF A CAPITAL ASSET
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) defines "capital gain" and "capital loss"
in terms of "the sale or exchange of a capital asset.', 5 Section 1221 defines a capital
asset as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means
property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade
or business), but does not include--
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a
kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the
taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property used in his trade or business, of a charac-
ter which is subject to the allowance for depreciation pro-
vided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or
business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composi-
tion, a letter of memorandum, or similar property, held by--
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts cre-
ated such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or
5 I.R.C. § 1222 (1986).
[Vol. 6
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similar property, a taxpayer for whom such prop-
erty was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of
such property is determined for purposes of deter-
mining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or
in part by reference to the basis of such property in
the hands if a taxpayer described in subparagraph
(A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordi-
nary course of trade or business for services rendered or from
the sale of property described in paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government (in-
cluding the Congressional Record) which is received from
the United States Government or any agency thereof, other
than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to
the public, and which is held by--
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publi-
cation, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of
such publication is determined for purposes of
determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole
or in part by reference to the basis of such publica-
tion in the hands of a taxpayer described in sub-
paragraph (A).6
The problem with this definition is that the list of properties excluded from the class
of capital assets is subject to alternative constructions. The list may be construed to
be a definition by genus and difference or as an enumerative definition.
Every definition has two parts, a definiendum and a definiens.7 The definien-
dum (literally, "thing to be defined") is the word or expression the meaning of which
the definition attempts to explain.8 The definiens (literally, "thing that does the
defining") is the explanation of the word or expression to be defined.9 Usually, the
definiens explains the essential attributes of the definiendum. For example, one of
the essential attributes of the definiendum "mammal" is "possesses a spine." The
proof that an attribute is essential is that a contradiction results if the definiendum is
affirmed while one or more of its essential attributes is negated. For example, a
"spineless mammal" is a contradiction. Something can not be both "spineless"
and a "mammal."
6Id.
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Definition by genus and difference consists of the following two-step proce-
dure:
1. The definiendum is located within some broad class (the genus).
2. Some essential attribute (the difference or specific difference) that
distinguishes the definiendum from the other members of the genus
is indicated.'"
One logical construction of the Section 1221 definition of an excluded asset is that
it is a definition by genus and difference. On this construction of the Section 1221
definition of an excluded asset, the definiendum is property and the specific
difference is not specified. The specific difference must be inferred from what is
common to each excluded asset. The significance of this view of the nature of the
definition of an excluded asset is that the list of excluded assets may be expanded
beyond that provided in Section 1221.11
An enumerative definition provides a complete list of the items to which the
definiendum applies. 12 For example, an enumerative definition of "U.S. Coin" is
"penny, nickel, dime, quarter, half-dollar, dollar." The set of items that constitute
the definiendum in an enumerative definition may or may not have an essential, or
set of essential, attributes that is common to each member of the set and that
differentiates it from items not belonging to the set. If the essential attributes are not
known, they are difficult to infer from the members of the set. For example, no one
particular metal is an essential attribute of "U.S. Coins" because they are variously
composed of copper, nickel, or silver. Since the list of excluded assets is short,
another logical construction of the Section 1221 definition of an excluded asset is
that it is an enumerative definition. The significance of this view of the nature of the
definition of an excluded asset is that the list of excluded assets may not be expanded
beyond that provided in Section 122 1.'"
THE CORN PRODUCTS CASE
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner concerned, in part, the tax
treatment to be accorded profits and losses from transactions in corn futures. 1 More
specifically, do such gains and losses result in capital gainsand losses or do they give
rise to ordinary income and deductions? The Corn Products Refining Company
(CPRC) was a manufacturer of products made from grain corn, including starch
syrup, sugar, and their by-products feed and oil. CPRC's principal product was
10 Id.
" The view that the Section 1221 definition of an excluded asset is a definition by genus and difference is
here referred to as the broad construction.
12 RESCHER, supra note 7, at 36.
13 The view that the Section 1221 definition of an excluded asset is an enumerative definition is here referred
to as the narrow construction.
'4 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (S. Ct. 1955).
[Vol. 6
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starch from which cerelose was derived. Cerelose is a refined sugar that competes
with cane and beet sugar, but at a lower price. The price competitiveness of cerelose
with substitutable cane and beet sugars is a function of the cost of the most important
direct material input used in the manufacturing process, grain corn. If the price of
spot corn is sufficiently high, price competition will be difficult if not impossible.
CPRC experienced uncompetitively high price levels for spot corn during the 1934
and 1936 droughts in the corn belt. To avoid a recurrence of the inability to engage
in price competition because of high spot pries for corn, the CPRC considered two
strategies.
The two strategies were based on the seasonal pattern of spot corn prices. All
else being equal, spot corn prices are generally lower at harvest and rise over time
as supplies dwindle until the next harvest. One strategy that takes this seasonal
pattern into account is to buy spot corn at harvest and store it until needed. This
strategy meant building additional storage capacity. Another strategy is to buy
future corn and take delivery as needed to satisfy manufacturing operations and sell
the remainder in early summer if no shortage is imminent. If shortages develop,
futures can be sold as spot corn is bought for grinding. In this manner, a balanced
position can be reached with respect to any increase in spot corn prices. In 1937,
CPRC adopted the futures strategy "as a part of its corn buying program" and "as
the most economical method of obtaining an adequate supply of corn" without
incurring the expenditure of large sums for additional storage facilities. 5 To build
additional storage capacity in order to maintain a large supply over a long time would
require incurring burdensome financing costs both on the facilities and the large
inventory. As a result of implementing the futures strategy, CPRC had net annual
gains from transactions in corn futures in some years and net annual losses in others.
The tax treatment to be accorded these gains and losses turned on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Section 1221.
The Corn Products Decision
The Supreme Court decided the issue of whether the results of CPRC's
transactions in corn futures should be accorded capital or ordinary tax treatment in
favor of the Commissioner. That is, the Court held that CPRC's profits and losses
from corn futures should be accorded ordinary loss tax treatment. 6 The Court's
reasoning was, in part, as follows:
Nor can we find support for petitioner's contention that hedging is not
within the exclusions of § 117(a) [now § 1221]. Admittedly, peti-
I' d. at 48.
6 At the time of the Corn Products decision, the definition of a capital asset was promulgated in Section 117
of the 1934 Code. Section 117 is the forerunner of Section 1221 of the present Code. The statutory schema
remains the same. All subsequent references to the definition of a capital asset or excluded asset are to Section
1221 of the current Code.
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tioner's corn futures do not come within the literal language of the
exclusions set out in that section. They were not stock in trade, actual
inventory, property held for sale to customers or depreciable property
used in a trade or business. But the capital-asset provision of § 117 [now
1221 ] must not be so broadly applied as to defeat rather than further the
purpose of Congress. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 108. Congress
intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday operations of
a business be considered as ordinary income or loss. The preferential
treatment provided by § 117 applies to transactions in property which
are not the normal source of business income. It was intended "to
relieve the taxpayer from.., excessive tax burdens on gains resulting
from a conversion of capital investments and to remove the deterrent
effect of those burdens on such conversions." Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U.S. at 100. Since this section is an exception to the normal tax
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of a capital
asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly.
This is necessary to effectuate the basic congressional purpose. This
Court has always construed narrowly the term "capital assets" in §
117. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31; Kieselbach v. Com-
missioner, 317 U.S. 399, 403."7
The conventional construction of these words was that the Court interpreted the
definition of an excluded asset as a definition by genus and difference. On this
construction of the Corn Products decision, the Supreme Court was viewed as
accepting "property" as the genus and finding the difference by examining
congressional intent. According to the Court, Congress intended property used in
everyday operations to be accorded ordinary tax treatment. Thus, the Court's
implicit definition of an "excluded asset" was "property used in everyday opera-
tions." The Court examined CPRC's futures contract transactions to determine
whether they were essential to "everyday operations." By concluding that the
futures contracts were essential to "everyday operations," the Court held that the
results of those transactions should be accorded ordinary tax treatment, even though
futures contracts are not excluded assets. Some commentator's who share this
construction of the Corn Products decision are Chirelstein, 8 Gustafsson, 9 Javaras,20
LeMaster, 2' Surrey, 22 Troxell & Noall, 23 and Tucker.24 Additionally, a number of
'7 Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52.
9 Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income Tax Treatment of Contract
Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46 (1964).
'9 Gustafsson, A Holding Company's Stock in a Subsidiary: A Capital or Ordinary Asset? 65 TEX. L. REV.
1029, 1035 (1987).
20 Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and Losses--The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 Taxes 770, 772 (1974).
2 1 LeMaster, Corporate Securities Losses: Is Corn Products Now Irrelevant? 3 J. CORP. TAX.-141, 144 (1976).
22 Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985, 993 (1956).
23 Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securities as CapitalAssets, 19 TAX. L. REV. 185, 187
(1964).
24 Tucker, The Warren Court: Its Impact on the Capital vs. Ordinary Concept Under the Internal Revenue
Code 17 KAN. L. REV. 53, 59 (1968).
[Vol. 6
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notes interpreting the Corn Products decision broadly have appeared in the Colum-
bia Law Review,2 Tax Lawyer,26 Yale Law Journal,27 Southern California Law
Review,28 and the Vanderbilt Law Review2 9 among others.
POST-CORN PRODUCTS DEVELOPMENTS
An ordinary loss may be netted against both ordinary income and a capital
gain.30 A capital loss may be netted only against a capital gain." An unused capital
loss may be carried back three years or forward five years to offset a capital gain in
those years.3 2 Any losses remaining after the three year carryback and five year
carryforward period expire.3 3 Therefore, a taxpayer with a loss from a capital asset
would prefer to have the loss classified as ordinary.
Under the conventional construction of the Corn Products decision, a loss
from a capital asset may be accorded ordinary tax treatment if the loss can be shown
to result from an asset that is essential to everyday operations. Since on the
conventional construction, no test is provided by the Court for determining whether
an asset is essential to everyday operations, such a test had to be developed. The first
test to develop for determining the circumstances under which property would be
considered essential to everyday operations was the business motivation test. That
motivation should be determinative for the classification of an asset as business or
investment is not immediately evident. For example, no significant objective
difference exists among various shares of the same class of stock in the same corpo-
ration. Except for insignificant differences attributable to stock certificates, one
common share of General Motors is virtually indistinguishable from any other
outstanding share with respect to the risks and rewards of ownership. Nevertheless,
the profits and losses resulting from ownership of common shares are given different
tax treatment for different holders of the same type of security. The tax treatment
of an investor in corporate securities is different from a dealer in the same type of
securities. Since no objective attributes differentiate capital assets that are from
those that are not essential to everyday operations, the courts in post-Corn Products
cases looked to subjective factors.
They found them in taxpayer motivation. For a taxpayer with a loss in an asset
only two motivations are relevant on the conventional construction of the Corn
25 Note, The Corn Products Doctrine and Its Application to Partnership Interests, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 341 and
n. 3 (1979).
26 Note, Taxpayer Motivation and the Corn Products Doctrine 29 TAX. LAW. 660, 662 (1976).
27 Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital" Assets Acquired for Business: The New Criterion, 65 YALE L.J.
401,406 (1956).
28 Note, The Unpleasant Taste of Corn Products, S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1979).
29 Note, Corporate Securities As "Business Property," 20 VAND. L. REV. 1242, 1250 (1967).
3 I.R.C. § 165(a) (1986).
" I.R.C. § 1211 (a) (1986).
32 I.R.C. § 1212(a) (1986).
3 I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1)(B) (1986).
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Products decision, investment and business motivation. The acquisition and holding
of an asset may be motivated solely by investment purposes, solely by business
purposes, or by a combination of business and investment purposes. Initially the
courts applied the predominant motivation test. In the predominant motivation test,
all factors indicating either investment or business motivation were weighed to as-
certain whether the acquisition and holding of the asset was motivated primarily by
a business purpose. Under the predominant motivation test, if the taxpayer was
motivated primarily by investment purposes in acquiring and holding an asset, the
asset was classified as investment property. If the taxpayer was motivated primarily
by business purposes in acquiring and holding an asset, the asset was classified as
business property. The predominant motivation test was used by the courts from the
date of the Corn Products decision until 1971. Many early court decisions citing
Corn Products deal with a single pattern of facts: the purchase of securities in order
to secure a source of raw materials or inventory. Such acquisitions are known as tie-
in purchases. Eventually the predominant motivation test was expanded to accord
ordinary income tax treatment to corporate securities acquired for a variety of
business reasons.
THE PREDOMINANT MOTIVATION TEST
Typical of the tie-in purchases cases is Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United
States in which the taxpayer, a newspaper publisher, purchased shares of a paper mill
to assure a steady supply of newsprint during a shortage. 34 Subsequently, when the
shortage eased and newsprint became available from regular sources of supply, the
publisher sold the shares. The taxpayer treated the loss as an ordinary loss. The
Commissioner contended Booth had acquired a manufacturing subsidiary that it held
for some years. As such, Booth's loss was a capital loss. The Court citing Corn
Products, among other precedential cases, formulated the predominant motivation
test as follows:
[i]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary
act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the
time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully de-
ducted from gross income as a business expense or ordinary loss. If, on
the other hand, an investment purpose be [sic] found to have motivated
the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized upon their
ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital asset
provisions of the Code.35
By applying the primary motivation test to Booth's acquisition of the paper mill
stock, the Court found that Booth's primary motivation was to acquire a source of
'4 Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
35 Id. at 921.
[Vol. 6
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 6 [1989], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol6/iss1/4
1989] LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORY OF THE 89
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1221
newsprint even if the subsidiary continued to manufacture and sell an unrelated line
of products as well. In the hands of Booth, the paper mill stock was not a capital asset.
Hence, Booth's losses on the paper mill stock were ordinary losses. Raw material
and inventory are not the only assets used in a business in everyday operations.
Losses on securities purchased for other than tie-in considerations qualified
for ordinary income tax treatment if the acquisition could be shown to be primarily
motivated by the needs of everyday operations. For example, in Schlumberger
Technology Corp. v. United States, the taxpayer's primary business was measfring
physical phenomena in the earth for aid in the detection of oil, gas, and other
minerals, as well as for scientific space exploration and other purposes.36 Electro-
Mechanical Research Incorporated (EMR), a wholly owned subsidiary of Schlum-
berger, "was also engaged in the measurement business, using taxpayer's and its
own expertise and research to develop telemetry devices and related measurement
components for use by military and space agencies in above ground measurement
problems." 37 EMR purchased the stock of American Systems Incorporated (ASI).
ASI was organized for the purpose of designing, developing, manufacturing, and
programming electronic systems, equipment and components for military use.
Schlumbeger believed that ASI's personnel could help it, through personal contacts,
in obtaining government contracts for the electronic businesses in which it and EMR
were engaged. Because of unexpected adverse business conditions and ASI's failure
to obtain governmental systems contracts, Schlumberger sold the stock in its
subsidiary at a loss.
The issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether Schlumberger's loss was to be
treated as an ordinary loss or as a loss from the sale of a capital asset. The
Government rejected the predominant motivation test as the correct basis for
deciding the issue. It argued that the loss was a capital loss for two reasons: The
securities were neither acquired as (1) a "temporary business expedient" as in the
tie-in purchase cases nor (2) to protect an existing business.38 The Fifth Circuit
rejected both arguments adhering instead to the primary motivation test. It held that
although the ASI acquisition was not essential to Schlumberger's primary business
of measuring physical phenomena in the earth for aid in detecting minerals, the
acquisition was essential to Schlumberger's secondary line of business of develop-
ing telemetry devices and related measurements for use by military and space
agencies. Hence, Schlumberger's loss on ASI stock qualified for ordinary loss tax
treatment. Had Schlumberger realized a gain on'the sale of ASI stock, it could have
claimed a capital gain on its tax return--in all probability without question from the
Internal Revenue Service (Service). Under the predominant motivation test any
taxpayer could claim ordinary tax treatment on loses from securities by demonstrat-
ing a business reason for acquiring them or capital tax treatment on gains by simply
36 Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971).37 Id. at 1116.
38 Id. at 1120.
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claiming them as such on the return. This possibility led to the next stage in the
development of the everyday operations test, namely, the substantial investment
motivation test and the exclusive investment test.
THE SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT MOTIVATION TEST
The conventional construction of the Corn Products decision in conjunction
with the predominant motivation test increased the potential for taxpayer whipsaw.
On the one hand, if a taxpayer realized a loss from the sale of securities acquired with
part-business and part-investment motivations the taxpayer could obtain ordinary
loss tax treatment by arguing that the securities were bought primarily for business
purposes: On the other hand, if a taxpayer realized a gain from the sale of securities
acquired with part-business and part-investment motivations the taxpayer could
obtain capital gains tax treatment simply by claiming them as such on his return or,
if questioned by the Service, by arguing that the securities were bought primarily for
investment purposes. This whipsaw potential has its origins in the conventional
construction of the Corn Products decision.
On the conventional construction, capital assets are distinguished from
excluded assets on the basis of the everyday operations test. If the everyday
operations test bifurcated property into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive
classes this whipsawing would not be possible. Recall that because "business
investment" is not a contradiction proves that 'business purpose" and' investment
purpose" are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes of property. Thus, on
the conventional construction, property may be classified as both business property
and investment property. The primary motivation test, by giving equal weight to
business and investment motives and by characterizing the acquisition of securities
in accordance with the dominant motivation, makes it no more difficult to argue that
the securities are capital assets than it is to claim that they are not. The substantial
investment motivation test evolved to close this loophole.
Unlike the predominant motivation test, the substantial investment motivation
test does not require the weighing of investment motives against business motives
in the acquisition of securities to determine which predominates and, therefore, the
tax treatment of any losses upon their subsequent disposition. The substantial
investment motivation test focuses solely on investment motives. Under the sub-
stantial investment motivation test, if substantial investment considerations moti-
vated the acquisition of securities, then any loss realized upon their subsequent
disposition would be denied ordinary loss tax treatment even if business motives
predominate. In other words, whether or not the acquisition of the securities is
essential to everyday operations is simply irrelevant. The securities may be
necessary to assure a source of raw materials or inventory but would still be capital
assets if their acquisition was at least partially motivated by investment considera-
tions. Initially what constitutes a" substantial" investment motive was not clarified.
[Vol. 6
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Eventually, any investment motivation was considered a substantial investment
motive.
In 1971, the substantial investment motivation test was first applied in
Dearborn Co. v. United States.39 In Dearborn, the taxpayer, a furniture manufac-
turer, purchased stock of Munising Delaware (MD), a producer of kiln dried lumber
and furniture dimension parts, as well as a seller of a wide variety of finished wood
products. At the time of acquisition, raw materials were difficult to obtain. It later
sold the stock at a loss. The issue before the Court of Claims was whether, the loss
should be accorded ordinary or capital tax treatment. Dearborn contended that it
acquired the stock to fulfill one of its major business needs, wood supplies. The
Government argued that Dearborn had acquired the stock as a permanent investment
with a view to increasing its own business, managing MD's business for fee income,
receiving dividends from MD stock, and sharing in potential capital growth of MD's
business of selling a wide variety of wood products.40 The Court found that the
predominant motivation for Dearborn's acquisition of MD stock were based on busi-
ness considerations. Nevertheless, the Court held that the shares of MD in the hands
of Dearborn were capital assets because their acquisition was also motivated by
investment considerations. The Court found the following to be indicative of
investment motivation: (1) The stocks were acquired without a premium over
market value. (2) The investment was permanent rather than temporary. (3) An
investment profit was anticipated. Since shares of MD were capital assets in the
hands of Dearborn, they were to be accorded capital loss tax treatment. In its decision
the Court of Claims did not quantify the term "substantial."
In W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, the term "substantial" was used to
mean "any.' '41 Since 1912 Windle was in the business of processing and selling raw
woolen stock and other woolen materials used by manufacturer's of woolen cloth.
During the 1950s, many of Windle's customers went out of business because of
increased foreign competition. As a result, Windle's sales declined from approxi-
mately $9,500,000 in 1956 to $3,000,000 in 1961. To assure itself of a source of
demand, Windle created a captive customer by organizing and purchasing a
controlling interest in Nor-West Fabrics, Inc. (NWFI), a company that was to
manufacture woolen products and, hence, buy wool products from Windle. Prior to
establishing NWFI studies predicted that NWFI would be profitable and that Windle
would profit from sales to it i.e., the value of Windle's share in NWFI was expected
to appreciate in value over time. NWFI's actual performance did not meet
expectations. It was profitable in only two out of its approximately nine years of
operations. Eventually, NWFI's assets were insufficient to meet the demands of its
creditors and the corporation was liquidated at a loss to Windle.
The issue before the Tax Court was whether Windle's loss on NWFI stock
3' Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. CI. 1971).
41 Id. at 1148.
41 W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1972).
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should be accorded ordinary or capital tax treatment. Windle's contended that its
acquisition and holding of NWFI stock was motivated by business considerations
and that therefore the stocks were excluded assets. The Government argued that
Windle's acquisition was partially motivated by investment considerations and that
any investment motivation required capital tax treatment. The Court found evidence
both of investment motivation and business motivation and that the latter predomi-
nated. Nevertheless, the Court held that stock purchased with any investment motive
is a capital asset even if there is a predominant business motive for the purchase. The
Court provided two reasons for its ruling. One reason is that the predominant
motivation test enables the taxpayer to expand the list of excluded assets in Section
1221 to property unrelated to that list. Another reason for the ruling is that in the
absence of a substantial investment motivation test, taxpayers would be presented
with greater opportunities to whipsaw by claiming an "ordinary loss on unsuccess-
ful investments and capital gains on successful one." 4 2 Windle is the last develop-
ment in motivation tests based on the conventional construction of the Corn
Products decision prior to the Supreme Court's Arkansas Best decision.
THE ARKANSAS BEST CASE
Arkansas Best Corporation (ABC) is a holding company with subsidiaries
engaged in the businesses of interstate trucking, new tire sales, used tire retreading,
and data processing. In 1968 as part of a growth through acquisition strategy, ABC
acquire 65% of the outstanding common stock of the National Bank of Commerce
(NBC), located in Dallas. During ABC's holding period, NBC went through a
growth phase (from 1969 to 1972) and a problem phase (from 1973 and 1976).
During both phases, ABC acquired additional shares of NBC stock by purchase,
capital calls, stock dividends, and conversion of debentures. During the growth
phase, the capital calls were made to accommodate the growth; during the problem
phase, the capital calls were made in response to loan portfolio problems. Near the
end of NBC's growth phase, a 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act
required ABC to to divest itself of NBC or to cease acquisitions of either new, or
going-concern, lines of nonbanking businesses. In 1971, ABC filed an irrevocable
declaration of divestiture with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas that committed
ABC to divest itself of control of NBC by 1981. In 1975, ABC sold 51% of the
outstanding shares of NBC in one block and the balance of its holdings in
installments from 1976 to 1980 pursuant to an option granted in 1975. The sales were
made at a loss to ABC.
The Supreme Court's Arkansas Best Decision
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the losses ABC realized from
the disposition of its holdings of NBC stock were to be accorded ordinary or capital
421 Id. at 713.
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loss tax treatment. ABC's case before the Court relied upon three arguments each
of which the Court refuted:4 3 First, ABC argued that the Section 1221 definition of
the term "capital asset" as "property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected
with his trade or business)" turns on the motivation behind the acquisition of the
property. The Court rejected this argument because (a) the Section 1221 definition
of a capital asset does not mention a motivation test and (b) such a test is in direct
conflict with the definition's parenthetical phrase "whether or not connected with
his trade or business."
ABC also contended that the five exceptions to the definition of a capital asset
listed in Section 1221 are illustrative rather than exhaustive "and that courts are
therefore free to fashion additional exceptions in order to further the general
purposes of the capital asset provisions.'" The Court rejected this argument for
three reasons. (a) The locution" but does not include" in the Section 1221 definition
of the term "capital asset" as "property held by the taxpayer[.] ... but does not
include" signifies that the five classes of property listed as exceptions are exclusive.
Without calling it such, the Court viewed the exceptions to the definition of a capital
asset as an enumerative definition of an excluded asset. (b) The legislative history
supports the view that the five classes of property listed as exceptions to the
definition of a capital asset are mutually exclusive. (c) The five exclusions would
be "superfluous if assets acquired primarily or exclusively for business purposes
were not capital assets." 45 For example, inventory, depreciable property used in a
taxpayer's trade or business, and accounts receivable acquired in the ordinary course
of business would satisfy such a business motive test.
Finally, ABC maintained that the ultimate support for its position that moti-
vation determines the character of an asset is the Corn Products decision. The Court
rejected ABC's reliance on the Corn Products decision on the grounds that such
reliance is based on a misinterpretation of the decision. The Court provided explicit
interpretation of various parts of the Corn Products decision. When the Court stated
in Corn Products that "the definition of a capital asset must be narrowly applied and
its exclusions interpreted conventionally," what the Court meant was that the
inventory exclusion of Section 1221, not that the phrase "property held by the
taxpayer," was to be interpreted conventionally:
[a] lthough the corn futures were not "actual inventory," their use as an
integral part of the taxpayer's inventory-purchase system led the Court
to treat them as substitutes for the corn inventory such that they came
within a broad reading of "property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer" in § 1221.46
13 Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 S. Ct. 971 (1988).
4' Id.
41 Id. at 975.
46 Id.
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When the Court stated in Corn Products that the reason CPRC's futures
contracts were not treated as capital assets was that the futures were "an integral part
of its business," what the Court meant was that the futures could not be considered
substitutes for stored grain corn unless this close connection existed between the
stored grain corn and the future contracts. If this connection did not exist, then
CPRC's futures dealings would amount to speculation in corn futures.
The Court added that another reason for not permitting securities to be treated
as capital assets, without referring to it as such, is to prevent taxpayer whipsawing.
The Court stated that one reason behind the Corn Products decision was to prevent
CPRC from whipsawing the Government.
In the Arkansas Best decision, the Supreme Court stated that the correct
interpretation of the Corn Products decision is as follows: "Corn Products is
properly interpreted as standing for the narrow proposition that hedging transactions
that are an integral part of a business' inventory-purchase system fall within the
inventory exclusion of § 1221."'
In a footnote to this sentence, the Court notes that 25 years have elapsed since the
Corn Products decision has been used by various courts to treat as ordinary assets
property that is not specifically excluded from the class of capital assets in Section
1221. However, the Court felt bound by the language of the Code regardless of
Congress' reticence. The footnote adds that the creation of any exclusions from the
class of capital assets as provided for in Section 1221 based on business motives,
"must come form congressional action, not silence." 48
How THE LIST OF EXCLUDED PROPERTIES MAY BE EXPANDED
IN LIGHT OF ARKANSAS BEST
The Arkansas Best decision did not reverse the Corn Products decision.
Rather, in Arkansas Best, the Court interpreted its earlier Corn Products decision.
That interpretation reads, in part, as follows:
The Court stated in Corn Products that the company's futures transac-
tions were "an integral part of its business designed to protect its
manufacturing operations against price increases in its principal raw
material and to assure a ready supply for future manufacturing require-
ments." 350 U.S., at 50. The company bought, sold, and took delivery
under the futures contracts as required by the company's manufacturing
needs. As Professor Bittker notes, under these circumstances, the
futures can "easily be viewed as surrogates for the raw material
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itself.' ,9
These words imply that the Court views surrogates for the inventory exclusion of
Section 1221 to be subject to the same tax treatment as inventory itself. Hence, the
list of excluded properties may be expanded beyond those specifically excluded by
the Code from the definition of a capital asset if such properties can be shown to be
surrogates for inventory. For example, in order for losses in corporate securities to
be accorded ordinary tax treatment, the losses must be incurred because the securities
were surrogates for inventory. An indication of how property may be regarded as
a surrogate for inventory by the Court is provided by what it accepted as surrogate
for grain corn in Corn Products:
...although the corn futures were not actual inventory, their use as an
integral part of the taxpayers inventory-purchase system led the Court
to treat them as substitutes for the corn inventory such that they were
within a broad reading of "property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer in Section 1221 .50
By analogy, if corn futures are a substitute for grain corn because they are an integral
part of an inventory-purchase system, then any property that is an integral part of an
inventory-purchase system also should be substitutes for the inventory itself. For
example, corporate securities that are an integral part of an inventory-purchase
system also should be substitutes for the inventory itself.
How securities may constitute an integral part of an inventory purchase system
can be inferred by analogy from these words:
A business connection although irrelevant to the initial determination of
whether an item is a capital asset, is relevant in determining the
applicability of certain of the statutory exceptions, including the inven-
tory exception. The close connection between the futures transactions
and the taxpayer's business in Corn Products was crucial in whether the
corn futures could be considered surrogates for the stored inventory of
the raw corn. For if the futures dealings were not part of the company's
inventory-purchase system, and instead amounted simply to specula-
tions in corn futures, they could not be considered substitutes for the
company's corn inventory, and would fall outside even a broad reading
of the inventory exclusion."
These words show that the Court distinguished between speculation in futures and
the use of futures as an integral part of an inventory-purchase system on the basis of
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a business connection. In Corn Products, inventory is the business connection.
Hence, the purchase and sale of futures contracts constitutes speculation if inventory
is unaffected and is an integral part of an inventory-purchase system if inventory is
affected. In order for property to be an integral part of an inventory-purchase system,
inventory must be affected by the purchase and sale of the property. For example,
in order for corporate securities to be an integral part of an inventory-purchase
system, inventory must be affected by the purchase and sale of the securities.
POLICY ISSUES RAISED By JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 1221
The history of judicial interpretation of the definition of a capital asset points
out the need to link any reestablishment of a capital gains tax with a reformulation
of the Section 1221. Presumably, Congress' objectives in any reestablishment of a
preferential capital gains rate include stimulating economic growth and increasing
Government revenue. The achievement of these objectives may be undermined if
ordinary tax treatment is accorded gains and losses resulting from transactions in
capital assets. The history ofjudicial interpretation of Section 1221 suggest that con-
gressional economic policy objectives may be undermined for two reasons: (1) In
the Arkansas Best decision, the Section 1221 definition of an excluded asset may be
interpreted incorrectly. (2) In the Arkansas Best decision, the Section 1221
definition of an excluded asset is interpreted correctly but the Supreme Court's
interpretation may be interpreted incorrectly by lower courts.
In the Arkansas Best decision, the Supreme Court itself points out the
possibility that its interpretation may not serve congressional economic policy:
Although congressional inaction is generally a poor measure of con-
gressional intent, we are given some pause by the fact that over 25 years
have passed since Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46 (1955), was initially interpreted as excluding assets acquired for
business purposes from the definition of a capital asset. See Booth
Newspapers, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 157 Ct. Cl. 886,303 F.2d 916 (1962).
Without any sign of disfavor from Congress. We cannot ignore the un-
ambiguous language of § 1221, however, no matter how reticent
Congress has been. If a broad exclusion from capital-asset status is to
be created for assets acquired for business purposes, it must come from
congressional action, not silence.52
As these words show, the Supreme Court does not find fault with the notion that
according ordinary tax treatment to business property would further congressional
economic policy. However, the formulation of the definition of an excluded asset
in Section 1221 does not allow the ordinary tax treatment of business property. Thus,
11 Id at 977 n. 7.
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an issue raised by the Supreme Court that needs to be addressed if preferential capital
gains rates are reestablished by Congress is whether the Section 1221 definition of
an excluded asset should be reformulated to include business property.
Even if the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1221 is correct, the
history of post-Corn Products developments suggests that the lower courts may
incorrectly interpret the Arkansas Best decision. On the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of Section 122 1, ordinary tax treatment is limited to those properties specifi-
cally excluded from the definition of a capital asset or to properties that are substi-
tutable for one of the excluded properties, e.g., corn futures. In the Arkansas Best
decision, the Supreme Court used a substitution test to justify the ordinary tax
treatment of losses in Corn Products' grain futures. This substitution test may evolve
in the lower courts in a manner unforeseen and unintended by the Supreme Court just
as the everyday operations test in its Corn Products decision evolved in a manner
unforeseen and unintended by the Supreme Court. To wit, the substitution test may
evolve so as to allow the ordinary tax treatment of losses resulting from transactions
in property that is neither an inventory-related futures contract nor specifically
excluded from the definition of a capital asset. Such an evolution would undermine
congressional economic policy just as the courts undermined congressional eco-
nomic policy for approximately thirty years (if the Arkansas Best decision is correct)
by allowing ordinary tax treatment of losses resulting from transactions in property
that is neither an inventory-related futures contract nor specifically excluded from
the definition of a capital asset. Thus, an issue raised by post-Corn Products
developments prior to the Arkansas Best decision that needs to be addressed if
preferential capital gains rates are reestablished by Congress is how to reformulate
the Section 1221 definitions so that they are less likely to be misinterpreted.
The judicial history reveals that the present formulation of Section 1221 is
subject to incompatible interpretations partially because the list of properties
specifically excluded from the definition of a capital asset may be interpreted as
either a definition by genus and difference or as an enumerative definition. Post-
Corn Products developments prior to the Arkansas Best decision equated capital
assets with investment property and non-capital assets with business property. On
the one hand, if Congress intends to tax transactions in investment property at
preferential capital gains rates and transactions in business property at ordinary
income rates, it should reformulate Section 1221 accordingly. Since listing all
investment and business properties separately is impracticable, an enumerative
definition is impracticable. Defining a capital asset as investment property and an
excluded asset as business property may lead to misapplication of tax rates if what
constitutes an investment or a business property is not clear. Thus, any definition of
investment property and business property by genus and difference must be
accompanied by criteria in accordance with which investment property or business
property can be identified as such. On the other hand, Congress may intend to tax
either (1) only those properties currently specifically excluded from the Section
19
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1221 definition of a capital asset or (2) those properties currently specifically
excluded from the Section 1221 definition of a capital asset and substitutes for those
properties. In either case, appropriate qualifiers need to be added to the current
formulation of the list of excluded assets.
CONCLUSION
The history of the judicial interpretation of Section 1221 is characterized by
inconsistency. In the past, congressional policy objectives for granting preferential
rates for capital gains included stimulating economic growth and raising Govern-
ment revenue. The inconsistent interpretations of Section 1221 may have under-
mined congressional economic policy. These inconsistent interpretations are
directly attributable to imprecise definitions of what is and what is not a capital asset.
If Congress reestablishes a preferential capital gains rate, it needs to reformulate Sec-
tion 1221 in order to forestall undermining of its economic policy and to prevent
unnecessary litigation.
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